Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate of Dr. Evil has been created. Upon learning this, how seriously should he take the hypothesis that he himself is that duplicate? I answer: very seriously. I defend a principle of indifference for self-locating belief which entails that after Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate has been created, he ought to have exactly the same degree of belief that he is Dr. Evil as that he is the duplicate. More generally, the principle shows that there is a sharp distinction between ordinary skeptical hypotheses, and self-locating skeptical hypotheses.
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Safe in an impregnable battlestation on the moon, Dr. Evil had planned to launch a bomb that would destroy the Earth. In response, the Philosophy Defense Force (PDF) sent Dr. Evil the following message:
Dear Sir, (Forgive the impersonal nature of this communication-our purpose prevents us from addressing you by name.) We have just created a duplicate of Dr. Evil. The duplicate-call him "Dup"-is inhabiting a replica of Dr. Evil's battlestation that we have installed in our skepticism lab. At each moment Dup has experiences indistinguishable from those of Dr. Evil. For example, at this moment both Dr. Evil and Dup are reading this message.
We are in control of Dup's environment. If in the next ten minutes Dup performs actions that correspond to deactivating the battlestation and surrendering, we will treat him well. Otherwise we will torture him.
Best regards, The PDF Dr. Evil knows that the PDF never issues false or misleading messages.
Should he surrender?
Whether Dr. Evil ought to surrender depends on whether he ought to remain certain that he is Dr. Evil once he reads the message. heads should be fool enough to create. If they do make a duplicate of me, I ought to remain certain that I'm Dr. Evil. Of course, the duplicate also ought to be certain that he's Dr. Evil.
Tough luck for him, but he's in no worse shape than various other deluded inhabitants of the skepticism lab.
I will argue that only the first of the two lines of reasoning is correct, and that after Dr. Evil receives the message he ought to have exactly the same degree of belief that he is Dr. Evil as that he is Dup. My plan is to use the Dr. Evil case to motivate a principle of indifference for self-locating belief, a principle that brings out a stark contrast between two kinds of skeptical hypotheses.
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What Dr. Evil ought to do depends on two factors: what his beliefs ought to be, and how his beliefs and values together ought to guide his action.
Let's isolate the first factor by considering some stripped-down cases.
Start with the case of O'Leary:
O'LEARY ( [5] ) O'Leary is locked in the trunk of his car overnight. He knows that he'll wake up briefly twice during the night (at 1:00 and again at 2:00) and that the awakenings will be subjectively indistinguishable (because by 2:00 he'll have forgotten the 1:00 awakening).
At 1:00 he wakes up.
When O'Leary wakes up at 1:00, he ought to be uncertain whether it is 1:00 or 2:00. That's because he is certain that he awakens both at 1:00 and at 2:00, and certain that his present experience doesn't distinguish between the two awakenings. I hear an objection:
TRUST YOUR MEMORIES, O'LEARY When O'Leary awakens, he doesn't remember any previous awakenings. Furthermore, he ought to trust his memories. So he ought to be very confident that there weren't any previous awakenings, and hence very confident that it is 1:00.
This objection is mistaken. It is true that, in the absence of defeating auxiliary beliefs, one ought to trust one's memories. 1 For example, you ought to trust your memory that you haven't been tickled in the last five minutes. But it is also true that, in the presence of the right auxiliary beliefs, one ought not trust certain memories much at all. For example, you might be sure that tickling makes very little of an impression on you, and that even if you had been tickled in the last five minutes you would have forgotten by now. In that case the fact that you don't remember any recent tickling would give you no reason at all to think that the last five minutes has been tickle-free.
Let me state that in a slightly different way. Right after he is locked in his trunk, O'Leary is certain just what predicament he is in: locked in a trunk at 9:00. But when he wakes up at 1:00, he no longer is certain what predicament he is in, because he is uncertain whether it is 1:00 or 2:00. The crucial difference between O'Leary's beliefs at 9:00 and his beliefs at 1:00 is this:
• At 9:00, O'Leary is confident that his current subjective state is only instantiated once throughout all of history: by O'Leary at 9:00.
• This kind of partial trust in one's memories is unusual, but it can be reasonable. For example, you might be confident that you had just received some transplanted memories from someone else's childhood, including the memory of holding a beloved one-eyed teddy bear. In such a case, you should be confident that someone once held a one-eyed teddy bear (namely, the person from whom you got the implanted memories). But you should also be confident that you never held such a bear, even though you remember doing so. For further discussion of such cases, see [3] .
I hope I've made it plausible that after Dr. Evil reads the message, he ought to be uncertain whether he is Dr. Evil or Dup. But belief is not an all-ornothing matter: it comes in degrees. For example, you might be uncertain whether the Yankees or the Dodgers won the 1955 world series, but still have a greater degree of belief that the Yankees won than that the Dodgers won. So there remains the question of how exactly Dr. Evil ought to apportion his confidence-or credence-between the hypothesis that he is Dr. Evil and the hypothesis that he is Dup.
There's a more general question lurking in the vicinity. Many times an agent is sure that her current subjective state is instantiated only once throughout history: by her, then. But sometimes an agent has some confidence that her current subjective state is instantiated several times throughout history. This can happen (as it does in the O'Leary case) if the agent is sure that she instantiates her current subjective state at more than one time. It can also happen (as it does in the Dr. Evil case) if the agent is sure that more than one person currently instantiates that state. 3 The cases described so far were intended to make it plausible that when an agent is sure that her current subjective state is instantiated several times, she ought to be uncertain which instantiation she is currently experiencing. But since belief comes in degrees, there remains the question of how such an agent ought to apportion her confidence among the various hypotheses about which instantiation she is currently experiencing.
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I'm going to defend an indifference principle for self-locating belief. To state the principle I'll need the notion of a centered world (see [2] ). A centered world is a possible world which has been equipped with a designated individual and time. 4 Just as a possible world represents a maximally specific way for the world to be, a centered world represents a maximally specific predicament for one to be in. A centered world represents the maximally specific predicament of being in the associated possible world as the designated individual at the designated time.
When an agent is uncertain about which of various possibilities obtain, she divides her credence among several possible worlds. Similarly, when an agent is uncertain about which of various predicaments she's in, she divides her credence among several centered worlds. 5 Call two centered worlds X and Y similar iff the following conditions are both satisfied:
• X and Y are associated with the same possible world. (In other words, they differ at most on who is the designated individual or 4 Formally, one can take a centered world to be an ordered triple of the form w, i, t , where w is a possible world, i is an individual who exists at w, and t is a time. 5 Here I follow a terminological variant of a suggestion in [2] .
what is the designated time.)
• X and Y represent predicaments that are subjectively indistinguish- which is centered on the duplicate), TailsAl, and TailsDup (notation similar; see Figure 1 ). Figure 1 : The TOSS&DUPLICATION protocol, in which a biased coin is tossed and a duplicate of Al is created regardless of the outcome. When Al awakens, he wonders which of four predicaments-represented by ovals-he is in.
My argument depends on three claims about Al's degrees of belief when he awakens. Since the first two are uncontroversial, I'll start with them.
Let P be the credence function Al ought to have when he first awakens, and let HEADS be the proposition that the toss outcome is heads.
First note that when Al awakens, his credence in HEADS ought to be 10%:
(1) P(HEADS) = 10%.
That's because he knew before he went to sleep that the coin had a chance of 10% of landing heads, and because upon awakening he neither gains nor loses information relevant to the toss outcome. From (1), (2), and (3) it follows that when Al awakens in TOSS&DUPLICATION he ought to have the same credence that he is Al as that he is the duplicate. 8 Since Al's credence in HEADS ought to be the same in DUPLICATION 7 Here I've depended on a principle that connects one's beliefs about chances with one's beliefs about the outcomes of chance processes. For more on such principles, see [1] .
8 Proof: Let H and T abbreviate HEADS and TAILS respectively, and use acronyms to abbreviate the names of the four centered worlds (for example, "HA" denotes HeadsAl). We must use (1)- (3) 9 Let me argue for that claim now.
Before Al was put to sleep, he was sure that the chance of the coin landing heads was 10%, and his credence in HEADS should have accorded with this chance: it too should have been 10%. When he wakes up, his epistemic situation with respect to the coin is just the same as it was before he went to sleep. He has neither gained nor lost information relevant to the toss outcome. So his degree of belief in HEADS should continue to accord with the chance of HEADS at the time of the toss. In other words, his degree of belief in HEADS should continue to be 10%.
I hear an objection:
TRUST YOUR MEMORIES, AL When Al awakens, he has memories indicating you doubt that it does, consider the following intermediate case:
DELAYED COMA The experimenters follow the TOSS&DUPLICATE protocol as described above (they toss a coin and duplicate Al). Then, five minutes after Al and the duplicate wake up the following morning, the experimenters use the toss outcome to determine which one gets to stay awake: if heads, they allow Al to stay awake (and put the duplicate into a coma); if tails, they allow the duplicate to stay awake (and put Al into a coma).
In DELAYED COMA, if Al were to wake up and remain awake for more than five minutes, that would put him in a position to assert "Either I am Al and the coin landed heads, or else I am the duplicate and the coin landed tails". He'd be in a position to assert this because under the DELAYED COMA protocol, if the coin lands heads, only Al gets to stay awake, but if the coin lands tails, only the duplicate does. So to defend (3), it is enough to show that after being so informed, Al should end up with credence 10% in HEADS.
In DELAYED COMA, there is a five minute delay between when Al and the duplicate wake up, and when the experimenters put one of them into a coma. Reducing or even eliminating that delay leaves the case in relevant respects the same. For example, if the delay were thirty seconds (rather than five minutes), then Al would only have to wait thirty seconds in order to be sure that he wasn't selected for the coma. But (supposing that he wasn't so selected), his final credence in HEADS should be the same in the thirty second delay case as it is in the five minute delay case. And it also should be the same in the limiting case, in which there is no delay at all. But we've seen that case: it is COMA.
So to defend (3) it is enough to show that in COMA, when Al wakes up he ought to have credence 10% in HEADS. that he is Al (for example, he remembers being Al as a child). He ought to trust those memories. So he ought to be confident that he is Al, and hence confident that the coin landed heads.
The night before the coin toss, Al had a hard time getting to sleep because he knew that if the coin landed tails he would be put into a coma. If TRUST YOUR MEMORIES, AL is right, then when Al wakes up the next morning he ought to announce with relief, "I made it!" Indeed, if TRUST YOUR MEMO-RIES, AL is right, Al ought to realize in advance that whatever happens, the person who wakes up the next morning ought to wake up confident that he is Al, and that the coin landed heads.
That's all wrong. TRUST YOUR MEMORIES, AL makes the same mistake that TRUST YOUR MEMORIES, O'LEARY does. While it is true that in the absence of defeating auxiliary beliefs, one ought to trust one's memories, when Al wakes up he does have defeating auxiliary beliefs. He is sure that-whatever the outcome of the coin toss-someone was to wake up in just the subjective state he is currently in. As far the outcome of the coin toss goes, the total evidence Al has when he wakes up warrants exactly the same opinions as the total evidence he had when he went to sleep.
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The bottom line: In COMA, when Al awakens he should have credence 10% in HEADS. We saw above that this claim is sufficient to defend (3). So (3) is true. 10 Here I have also set myself against an intermediate view, according to which Al's beliefs about the setup only partially undermine his memories of being Al. According to such a view, when Al wakes up his credence in HEADS ought to be slightly higher than 10%. I owe this point to Jim Pryor. Remember that it follows from (1) There is a stark contrast between two sorts of skeptical hypotheses.
According to one sort of hypothesis, your sensory evidence has misled you into believing many false propositions. (Example: the hypothesis that nothing exists except a single deluded brain in a vat.)
A different sort of skeptical hypothesis arises only if you are confident that your current subjective state is instantiated more than once. This second sort of hypothesis conflicts with none of the propositions that you believe.
11 But according to such a hypothesis, your location within the world is different than you'd thought. When Field's maintenance man wonders whether he is a brain in a vat, he is considering a hypothesis of this second sort.
There is a default bias against the first sort of skeptical hypothesis.
Even if one's total evidence fails to rule such a hypothesis out, one is rea- Suppose that Dr. Evil creates many brains in vats, each in a subjective state matching his own. I say that it is then reasonable for him to wonder whether he is one of those brains. Objection: Dr. Evil's reason for thinking that there are lots of brains is that he remembers creating them. If he trusts that memory, then he should also trust that he isn't one of the brains. (For this objection I thank an anonymous referee, whose comments I have paraphrased.) Reply: it is reasonable for Dr. Evil to trust his memories in one respect, but not another (as is discussed in note 2). He ought to trust what they entail about what happened to Dr. Evil. But he ought not to trust that he is Dr. Evil. But again, these special features of DUPLICATION were not essential to the toss argument. For example, one can use exactly analogous arguments to show that when O'Leary awakens, he should have the same degree of belief that it is 1:00 as that it is 2:00. So INDIFFERENCE is true quite generally.
